The Unmanned Bridge Space

Unmanned Machinery Spaces (UMS) are all the rage these days; engine rooms that can sail the world without anybody in them for certain periods of time (12 or 16 hours etc!) are very common and only cruise ships and other specialized vessels still go for fully manned machinery spaces, as required by law.

Unmanned Bridge Spaces (UBS) though are not something that one often hears about or something that is legal through any stretch of a misguided mate's imagination. It is also not legal to leave the cook alone on the bridge whilst the mate goes down to scream at the crew, for an engineer to sit in the drivers chair whilst the Captain goes for a read of the Sunday Sport on the 'dunny' nor for the autopilot to be treated as a fully-fledged and trusted Officer of the Watch (OOW). Oh, and the Master who feels that peering out of his cabin porthole is effectively covering the duties of a lookout is well, a bit old hat!

Standards of Training, Certification and Watch Keeping 95 (STCW 95) are the rules and regulations of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) that govern the very livelihood of nearly every merchant seafarer on the high seas! Those seafarers and country governments that tend to ignore IMO and its rules are few and far between and will be no more than North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Transporters, Osama Bin Laden's Offshore Terrorist Training Vessel (OBLOTTV) and some Columbian Drug Lord's pleasure yacht!

Within the haloed and little revered covers of the code is a section that governs the quality and quantity (requirements) of those persons on the bridge whilst the ship is underway! Without repeating the regulations verbatim, as interpretation is subjective to opinion and current mood, the regulations do point strongly towards all vessels having a lookout in addition to the OOW during night time voyages. IMO has not gone as far as enforcing two-man presence on the bridge during daylight hours (although it seems common sense to have two persons when in restricted waters or channels) but due to some recent and unfortunate accidents the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) in the UK are strongly pushing for an amendment to include two-manned bridges in restricted waterways and channels during daylight hours.

Many vessels that spend a lot of their time in enclosed spaces sail with one Master and one Mate who work on a six hour on, 6 hour off rotation. Simple mathematics and a general idea as to another of STCW's chapters is that the mate and the master can never really double up on the bridge unless they are robots on steroids! So either the mate or the master are always sailing these vessels alone with a deck crew-member (Able Bodied Seaman - AB) whose basic duty is to keep a lookout! But is this enough? The MAIB in its pursuit of reducing accidents is also calling for the minimum manning requirements to be changed so that vessels are required to carry a master and two mates at all times.

There is often misunderstanding as to what a 'lookout' is or what the actual duties are! The IMO and STCW 95 do not go far enough in establishing a lookouts role: a lookout who is unable to take control of the vessel should the OOW be incapacitated is not much use at all! A lookout that cannot converse with a shore party over the radio is basically not worthy of his position! But for the most part lookouts are defined in regulations as, well to put it plainly, persons that can keep a lookout!

Mr. Richard A Block wrote an article titled '45 Musts for Effective Watch keeping' which was subsequently published in the Gulf Mariners Association newsletter in May 2001! Mr. Block in his article used the definition of a lookout as follows:

A "lookout" has been defined by the federal courts as a person who is specially charged with the duty of observing the lights, sounds, echoes, or any obstruction to navigation with the thoroughness that the circumstances permit.

He went on further to say that:

The vigilance of a lookout is often judged by his effectiveness in preventing a collision. Failing to discover the lights of a vessel in time to avoid collision is equivalent to not posting a proper lookout.

And then he said:

A lookout must be assigned no other duties that could detract from keeping a proper lookout. He must devote his complete attention to being a lookout. Consequently, a helmsman or OOW of the watch cannot properly fulfill the duties of a lookout!

Many coastal vessels in practice do not use a lookout during daylight hours simply because the AB's onboard are either tired or working on important deck jobs such as closing hatches for sea, lashing cargo, or keeping an ISPS watch, etc! A couple of recent incidents highlight this, one of these being the Hoo Finch.

The Hoo Finch was en route from Teesport to Teignmouth, and was following a planned track which took her through the deep water anchorage and close to the pilot boarding area off the River Humber. The Front Viewer had recently weighed anchor and, with one pilot on board, was maneuvering to pick up a second pilot before entering the river bound for Immingham. The Hoo Finch, as the give way vessel, failed to take early and substantial action to avoid the close quarter's situation. A collision was narrowly avoided by last minute action taken by both vessels. In accordance with her minimum safe manning certificate, Hoo Finch carried a total of two watch keeping officers, the master and the mate, as well as three ratings. The mate was alone on the bridge during the 0000 to 0600 watch contrary to the requirements of the STCW Code. As the situation developed, he was unable to properly interpret what he could see and, consequently, he failed to take prompt and decisive avoiding action. The mate admitted to being tired. His recorded hours of work and rest during the days preceding the incident were analyzed and it was concluded that his performance was degraded due to an accumulated sleep debt and disruption to his circadian rhythm.

Nobody really understands what this means but to clarify as best as possible, he was dog tired and could hardly keep his eyes open, sort of at the pencil stabbing in the forehead stage! The incident has prompted the Department for Transport (DOT) to warn all ships of the dangers of crew fatigue. And we must now all thank the DOT for their fine input, as if nobody knew about this before!

The other incident involved the Gerhein C, a 910grt general cargo vessel that ran aground in April 2003 as it approached the River Thames, inward bound to Sheerness. The story runs that an evil bee or wasp attacked the master violently and managed to sting him in the ear thus incapacitating him!

The Maritime Coast Guard Agency said, "This incapacity meant that a proper lookout was not being maintained. This failure resulted in the grounding in the vicinity of the Kentish flats in the River Thames".

Bryan Hopkins of the MCA further commented, "The requirement for a lookout on the bridge of a ship is clearly laid down in the STCW Code. This case acts as a reminder to owners, managers and operators of all vessels to ensure that the bridge is properly manned at all times, especially at night when in congested/pilotage waters".

Thank you Bryan! But the question remains that if there had been a lookout present would he/she have been able to avert disaster? The lookout presumably would have been either on the bridge wing, up forward or at the very best staring out the bridge window. He might not have realized that a bee had stung his master's ear until too late. And if he had noticed the other question remains as to his ability to have done anything to prevent the disaster in way of taking control of the vessel!

What the MAIB, the MCA, IMO and the hundreds of other safety and government authorities from the many countries around the world seem to miss is that masters and crews do not willingly sail vessels without proper lookouts; that they do not like to be labeled as hazardous nor to be non-professional seafarers who prefer to cut corners rather than following set laws and guidelines! And nor do they like running vessels aground! Crew on vessels work hard! They now work harder than they have ever done before due to a surfeit of Governmental and international policies that have sewn up freedom and rest like the stuffing in a mattress! And of course companies run their vessels to complete minimum manning requirements so crews onboard have more work than ever before and less time to do it in and therefore corners are cut where possible, like sailing up the English Channel or through the Singapore Straits with only the Officer of the Watch on the bridge!

For the last decade if not more authorities and safety bodies have highlighted that stress is a common factor of modern day seafaring. Numast and such other union bodies that look after the welfare of seafarers constantly canvas governments to improve conditions. In fact so many reports exist that to read them all would cause any interested party undue stress!

The MAIB has in recent months been the most vocal body in trying to improve conditions and to reduce the possibility of further accidents at sea. They conducted a study on the problem which concluded that: the current provisions of STCW 95 in respect of safe manning, hours of work and lookout are not effective. The MAIB has recommended that the MCA takes the conclusions of the study forward to the IMO with the aim of reviewing:

1. The guidelines on safe manning, to ensure that all merchant vessels over 500grt have a minimum of a master plus two bridge watch keeping officers, unless specifically exempted for limited local operations as approved by the Administration.

2. The requirements of STCW 95 to change the emphasis with respect to the provision of a designated lookout to ensure that a lookout is provided on the bridge at all times, unless a positive decision is taken that, in view of daylight and good visibility, low traffic density and the vessel being well clear of navigational dangers, a sole watchkeeper would be able to fulfill the task.

3. The requirements of STCW 95 so that a bridge lookout can be more effectively utilized as an integral part of the bridge team

So Mr. Brock, who suggested that, "A lookout must be assigned no other duties that could detract from keeping a proper lookout. He must devote his complete attention to being a lookout", things might change!

It is though apparent that groundings or collisions do not always occur due to a lack of a proper lookout or the fact that the mate was fast asleep at the time! An incident a few years ago (that may lack some truth) highlights this: a research vessel in Argentinean waters ran aground after the Master let off such a foul smell that the pilot, the lookout and the master himself evacuated the bridge. In their hurry to get away they forgot about the safe navigation of the vessel and subsequently ran it high and dry!

Another incident involved an offshore supply vessel which at the time of crashing into the leg of a jack up was rather top heavy with brass, and a lookout to boot! The Master, the Mate and the Chief Engineer were all busy peering into the gyro compass as it had recently failed; the lookout was busy washing the cups and filling up the kettle ready for tea! Nobody thought to look out of the window!

It is hoped that the MAIB does manage to get its voice heard in IMO, that regulations are put in place to increase manning levels on vessels and it is hoped that one day crews and officers of vessels will not feel the need to lie on their Hours of Work Sheets to maintain a sense of balance with companies and their employers! In the meantime something to think about is:

The term "watch" means to be alert, attentive, or vigilant. The older connotation of the word was to continue without sleep, keeping vigil, or continually being on ones guard. I think the older definition still applies despite SCTW 95!